A novel approach for the study of games with strategic uncertainty is proposed. Games are defined such that players' strategy spaces do nor only contain pure and mixed strategies but also contain "ambiguous act strategies", in the sense that players can base their choices on subjective randomization devices. The notions of "independent strategies" as well as "common priors" are relaxed in such a manner that they can be applied to the context of games with strategic uncertainty even though the player's preferences cannot necessarily be represented by expected utility functions. The concept of "Ambiguous Act Equilibrium" is defined. The main result concerns two player games in which preferences of all players satisfy Schmeidler's uncertainty aversion as well as transitivity and monotonicity. The ambiguous act equilibria of such a game are observationally equivalent to the mixed strategy equilibria of that game in the sense that a researcher who can only observe equilibrium outcomes is not able to determine whether the players are uncertainty averse or uncertainty neutral.
Introduction
There is ample experimental evidence that people treat risky situations in which they know the odds of all relevant outcomes differently form ambiguous situations in which they can only guess these odds. The Ellsberg Paradox, which shows exactly that, is one of the most well-established violations of expected utility theory. The Ellsberg Paradox has inspired a large range of different generalizations of expected utility theory. This branch of decision theory continues to thrive. 1 Uncertainty aversion is deemed particularly relevant in situations that are new to the decision maker. Once a decision maker has encountered a situation many times he should have learned the odds of particular outcomes. In this vein, we might expect that someone who is new to gardening would exhibit uncertainty aversion with respect to bets on the growth of her plants.
On other hand, a seasoned gardener should have learned the odds of her plants reaching a certain size. The seasoned gardener should not exhibit any ambiguity aversion when it comes to a bet on the number of leaves on her basil plant by June 15th.
Just as much as this reasoning applies to single person decision problems this reasoning should apply to strategic decision problems. Palacios-Huerta [19] , for instance, argues that penalty kicks in professional soccer are a good testing ground for the predictions of mixed strategy equilibrium, as professional soccer players have a large set of experience to draw from when it comes to that particular "game". We should expect that the professional goalies view the direction of a penalty kick as the outcomes of a lotteries with known odds. 2 . Conversely we should expect that players who do not know the other players (or who just don't not know what to expect from them in the context of a particular situation) should not be able to describe the other players strategies in terms of some known probabilities. Following the experimental evidence cited above we would expect that such players would exhibit ambiguity aversion when they face a "new" game.
In short, ambiguity aversion should be at least as relevant for strategic decision making as it is for individual decision making. It is surprising, then, that the literature on games among players that are ambiguity averse stayed comparatively small. 3 1 Some of the seminal contributions are Schmeidler [21] , Gilboa and Schmeidler [10] , and Bewley [5] , for some more recent contributions see Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rusticchini [15] , and Ahn [1] 2 The same view is expressed in Chiappori, Levitt and Groseclose [7] . In fact one of the arguments to use penalty kicks to test the predictions of mixed strategy equilibrium is that "the participants know a great deal about the past history of behavior on the part of opponents as this information is routinely tracked by soccer clubs". This argument was first brought forward by Walker and Wooders [22] who initiated the use of data from professional sports to test the predictions of mixed strategy equilibrium 3 For a review see Tallon and Mukerji [?] . Note that in some of the applications players are assumed to be uncertain about the environment rather than about each other's strategies, see Bade [3] , Levin and Ozdenoren [13] ,
The goal of this paper is first of all to provide a novel approach of a game theory with uncertainty averse players. This novel approach proceeds under the assumption that players can choose to play ambiguous strategies. The players in the present approach can not only pick pure or mixed strategies, they can choose to base their decision on subjective random devices.
Say the gardener of the above example is also a professor that has to decide whether to test her students on topic A or on topic B. She might either pick a pure strategy (test topic A), a mixed strategy (she could role a dice and test A if and only if the dice shows the number 1) or an ambiguous strategy (she could test topic A if and only if her basil plants grew more than 300 leaves by the last day of classes). Assuming that not all of her students are experienced gardeners this makes her strategy ambiguous from the point of view of the students. In terms of the Ellsberg example, the decision of the professor now resembles a draw of an urn with yellow and blue balls in an unknown proportion.
All prior definitions of games with ambiguity averse players that are uncertain about each other's strategies that I am aware of assume that the players either choose pure or mixed strategies. 4 This assumption prevented the authors of the prior studies to define equilibrium in the context of such games as a straightforward application of Nash equilibrium. Nash equilibrium would require that all players maximize against a belief and that this belief is true. The second condition implies that there would be no scope for uncertainty here, given that the other players choose mixed or pure strategies. Consequently the equilibrium concepts in the literature all build on different relaxations of the condition that the equilibrium beliefs are true. These equilibrium concepts all require that players optimize given some belief about the other players strategies which is not to far from the actual strategies of the other players. So the most important question becomes how should "not too far" be interpreted. The papers in the literature all give different answers to this question, I will discuss and compare some of the most prominent approaches in section 6.
With the present approach to games with ambiguity averse players I am able to circumvent this problem. The enriched strategy spaces which contain ambiguous acts as well as pure and mixed strategies allow me to straightforwardly apply Nash equilibrium to define an equilibrium concept for games with uncertainty averse players. In section 2.6 I will define an Ambiguous Act Equilibrium as a profile of ambiguous act strategies such that no player has an incentive to deviate given all other players' strategies.
There is really just one hurdle to be taken on the way to this definition as games that allow players to use all kinds of subjective randomization devices allow players to use correlation devices. Imagine that the gardening professor of the first example has two friends who play battle of the sexes (they need to decide whether to vacation in Paris or in Rome). Each one of them could condition their choice of a destination on the growth of the professors basil plant.
Once it is time to buy the ticket the professor will give each one of them a leaf-count. Here the subjective randomization device basil plant works as a correlation device. The entire section 2.3
will be devoted to ruling out such correlation devices which is somewhat harder than one might initially think as there are no probabilities that can be used to define independent strategies.
Once I define my equilibrium concept I head towards the main result of this paper which states that for two player games the set of all ambiguous act equilibria is observationally equivalent to the set of all mixed strategy equilibria of a game if we assume that preferences are transitive, monotonic and satisfy Schmeidlers axiom of uncertainty aversion. An equilibrium in mixed strategies and an ambiguous act equilibrium are called observationally equivalent if action profiles happen with positive probability in the mixed strategy equilibrium if and only if these action profiles happen with positive probability in some nun-null events in the ambiguous act equilibrium. In plain English this result can be restated as: An experimentalist who only observes action profiles is not able to tell whether the players are expected utility maximizers or whether they are ambiguity averse.
This results contrasts the present notion of equilibrium strongly with the majority of the existing equilibrium concepts in the literature. These concepts usually find that the equilibrium predictions depend on the level or uncertainty aversion of the players. 5 I will use the main result to shed some light on the interpretation and comparison between these competing concepts.
Finally I will turn to games with more than 2 players. After the presentation of an example that
shows that things could turn out differently when there are more than 2 players I will conclude with a discussion why I leave the study of games with more than two players for further research.
2 Ambiguous Games
General Ambiguous Games
A general ambiguous game G is defined to be any G = (I, Ω, S, A, ) that has the following interpretations and properties. The set of players is I = (1, ..., n). There is a finite state space
. Player i's knowledge of states s ∈ Ω is described by an event algebra S i 5 This excludes Lo [14] on Ω such that every event E ∈ S i can be represented as
Abusing notation I denote the event E i × Ω −i also by E i . 6, 7 All the σ-algebras S i generate a σ-algebra S on Ω. Player i's action space is denoted by A i and I define A = × i∈I A i . Action spaces are assumed to be finite, I define |A i | = n i for all players i. The set of all lotteries on A is called P(A). 8 The preferences of players are defined over all S-measurable acts f : Ω → P(A).
The preferences of player i are denoted by i , the preferences of all players are summarized by = × i∈I i . A strategy of a player is a S i -measurable function f i : Ω → P(A i ). For every state the player picks a lottery over his action space.
A strategy profile × i∈I f i induces an act f with f (s)(a) = i∈I f i (s)(a i ) for all a ∈ A. The probability that an action-profile a is being played in state s is determined as the product of the probabilities that all players play action a i in state s. I denote the act induced by a strategy profile × i∈I f i as well as the strategy profile itself by f .
Note that the above definition of a game assumes that every player has access to an objective, but secret randomizing device, that can generate any lottery on the player's action space A i . This is implied by our assumption that the strategy space of a player is the space of S i -measurable acts f i : Ω → P(A i ) which says that players are free to generate their strategic choices using roulette wheels, dices, objective computer generators or similar things. However, they don't have to. They are equally free to base their choices on their mood of the day, or on any other subjective random device to which they have access. I believe that this assumption is natural for the context of game theory, however, the equilibrium concept proposed here is also suitable for acts f : Ω → A, in which no objective lotteries are assumed.
Acts
We use the letters f, g, f i , g i to denote various acts. Lotteries on action profiles and action spaces are denoted by p, q ∈ P(A) or p i , q i ∈ P(A i ) respectively. As a shorthand we denote a constant act f with f (s) = p for all s ∈ Ω and some p ∈ P(A) directly by p (and accordingly for f i ).
Degenerate lotteries, that is lotteries p ∈ P(A) and p i ∈ P(A i ) such that p(a) = 1 for some a or p i (a i ) = 1 for some a i are denoted a or a i . Finally constant acts with f (s) = a or f i (s) = a i for all s ∈ Ω are denoted by a and a i respectively. Constant acts a correspond to pure strategy 6 I follow the usual convention and define xJ := (xi)i∈J and x−J := (xi) i / ∈J for any subset J ⊂ {1, ..., n} for any vector x = (x1, ..., xn). So x−i denotes the vector of all but the i-th component of x = (x1, ..., xn). 7 We could also think of Si as an event algebra on Ωi 8 At times I will use the n-dimensional simplex ∆ n := {(x1, ..., xn)| P i xi = 1, xi ≥ 0 for all i} to denote P(X) for some finite set X of size n. The expression ∆ n + = {(x1, ..., xn)| P i xi = 1, xi > 0 for all i} denotes the subset of all lotteries in ∆ n with full support. When n is clear from the context it shall be omitted.
profiles, constant acts a i correspond to pure strategies. Constant acts p and p i correspond to mixed strategy profiles and mixed strategies respectively. In short, pure and mixed strategies are naturally embedded in the framework of general ambiguous games.
Often I will want to evaluate an act in which player i plays the constant act that he would play according to act f i in state s in all possible states when all other players play acts f −i . This act is written as (f i (s), f −i ), where f i (s) denotes the constant act in which player i chooses the lottery f i (s) in every state. The mixture αf + (1 − α)g of two acts f, g is defined component
wise, meaning that (αf + (1 − α)g))(s)(a) = αf (s)(a) + (1 − α)g(s)(a) for all a ∈ A and all s ∈ Ω. An event is considered Savage null by a player i if the values that an act f assumes on this event is irrelevant
for s / ∈ E. If an event E is not i-null then we call this event i-non null. We call an event simply null if it is i-null for all players i. A state s ∈ Ω is called i-null if there exists an i-null event E that contains s. A state is called null if it is i-null for all players i.
For any two acts f, g (or f i , g i respectively) and any event E ∈ S (or E i ∈ S i ) define the act
We let f 
Independent Strategies
The goal of the present study is to see how the equilibrium predictions for a game change when the assumption of expected utility maximizing players is replaced by the assumption of ambiguity averse players. It needs to be ascertained that the results of this paper are not driven by some extraneous features of the definition of an ambiguous game. In this section I show that general ambiguous games are too general for the purposes of this study, as they allow for all kinds of correlation devices. In short, the present generalization of a game goes to far, this generalization does not only allow for different attitudes towards ambiguity but also allows for correlation devices. To see this take the following example of Battle of the Sexes. Assume that Ann and Bob observe whether it rains or shines: S i = {∅, {r i }, {s i }, {r i , s i }} for i = a, b 9 . Also assume that both players consider the events {(r a , s b )} and {(s a , r b )} null, that is they are convinced that they will never disagree on the weather. In this case both players can use the weather to coordinate their actions. Let each player have two actions (a 1 , a 2 ) for Ann and
Ann and Bob use the weather to coordinate their actions.
In fact the notion of a general ambiguous game corresponds to the definition of a game that
Aumann [2] uses in the article in which he introduces the concept of correlated equilibrium. This is not as easy as it sounds as the standard notion of independent strategies relies on the expected utility representation of the preferences of all players. So I need to develop a behavioral notion of independent strategies. To do so I extend the common notion of state independent preferences to the context of games. Remember that state independence requires that an agent that prefers one option to another in some state should prefer the first option to the second in any other state. For the case of independent strategies I impose that if one player prefers to play one action over another in some event then that player should prefer the first to the second action in any other event. More generally, I impose that the worth of a strategy for a subgroup of players J cannot depend on the event in which it is played. Let's reconsider weather events. If a player i prefers to play the lottery p i to the lottery q i when he observes rain, meaning that he compares to strategies that differ only when it rains but are equal for all other kinds of weather given a fixed strategy profile for all other players, then this player should prefer p i to q i for any weather. If not this player has to believe that the other players can also peg their actions to the weather, which in turn entails that the weather can be used as a correlation device. I state this 9 Recall the convention that for every event E ⊂ Ω in player i's event algebra Si on Ω there exists an event Ei ⊂ Ωi such that E = Ei ×Ω−i. The above notation is a shorthand for Si = {∅, {(ri, sj), (ri, rj))}, {(si, sj), (si, rj)}, Ω} definition formally as:
Definition 2 Take a general ambiguous game G = (I, Ω, S, A, I, ). Then S J is called iindependent of S −J if the following condition holds for all S −J -measurable acts f −J : Ω →
If player i's preferences can be represented by an expected utility function then the behavioral notion of independence given in definition 2 coincides with the standard notion of independence.
Observe that the definition of independence is quite general. It does, for example, not imply symmetry: It is easy to construct a 2 player game in which S 1 is 1-independent of S 2 , whereas S 2 is not 1-independent of S 1 . Finally observe that for J = I this definition implies that no players preferences are state dependent: If any player likes the lottery p better than the lottery q in event E he has to like p better than q in ANY event. To see Definition 2 at work let us reconsider example 1.
Example 2 Consider Example 1 and add some information on the players preferences. Let
Ann and Bob's preferences and payoffs be given by the following matrix
Keep the assumption that Ann considers the events {(r a , s b )} and {(s a , r b )} null. To save on notation I define the events {(r a , r b )} := r and {(s a , s b )} := s. Fix the following 3 acts f, g, h by
and illustrate these acts by the following table 10 :
We assume that f a h a g and will show that S a is not a-independent of S b . Fix Bob's
a contradiction to S a being a-independent of S b . While a 2 is a better response to f b than is a 1 , it is not true that a 2 is a better response than a 1 in every event. The merit of Ann's strategies does depend on the state in which they are played. 
Basic Agreement
The goal of this paper is to compare the equilibria in the mixed extension of a game to the set of equilibria of the same game when players are allowed to use subjective randomization devices. The guiding question is: can an outside observer detect any difference between the two equilibrium sets? We assume that an outside observer cannot observe strategies but only outcomes. When seeing an outcome (action profile) the observer will have to ask: is there a mixed strategy equilibrium such that this profile happens with a positive probability? Alternatively the outside observer has to ask: could this strategy profile happen under an ambiguous act equilibrium? To answer the second question an interpretation of the formulation "could this happen?" is needed. I will identify this question with the question: is there a non-null event in which this strategy profile happens with positive probability? But as of now not even this question is well-defined, as there might be some events that are non-null for some players but are null for others. Whose point of view should the researcher then adopt? I will avoid this question by imposing a form of basic agreement:
11 Using the terminology defined here it can be said that in Klibanoff's definition the relation has to hold only if (qJ , f−J ) = (rJ , f−J ) = a for some action profile a 
Ambiguous Games and Ambiguous Act Extensions
In this section we define the main object of this study: ambiguous games are defined as general ambiguous games with independent actions and basic agreement. An ambiguous act extension of a game G is an ambiguous game G such that G reduces to G when we restrict all players to take only mixed strategies.
Ambiguous Act Equilibria
The preparations in the prior sections allow me to use the standard notion of Nash equilibrium to define an equilibrium concept for games with ambiguity averse players. An ambiguous act equilibrium is defined as a Nash equilibrium of an ambiguous game.
Definition 6 Take an ambiguous game G = (I, Ω, S, A, ).
A strategy profile f is called an ambiguous act equilibrium if there exists no S i -measurable act f i : Ω → P(A i ) for any player
We call f an ambiguous act equilibrium (AAE) of a game G = (I, A, ) if there exists an ambiguous act extension G of G such that f is an ambiguous act equilibrium in G.
The goal of this study is to contrast the set of AAE of a game G = I, A, with the set of all its mixed strategy equilibria. The set of all (mixed strategy) Nash equilibria of this game G is denoted by NE.
Observational Equivalence
The main claim of this study is that the ambiguous act equilibria and the Nash equilibria of a game G = {I, A, } are observationally equivalent when the preferences of all players satisfy
Schmeidler's uncertainty aversion in addition to monotonicity and transitivity. Observational equivalence captures the idea that an outsider who only observes the actions profiles that players choose cannot tell whether the players are ambiguity neutral or ambiguity averse. To make this claim the notion of observational equivalence needs to be defined. This notion is based on the notion of the support of an ambiguous act, which is defined next.
Definition 7
We say that an action a i (action profile a) is played sometimes in strategy f i (strategy profile f ) if there exists a non-null event
. Otherwise we say that action a i (a) is never being played in strategy f i (strategy profile f ). We call the set of all actions that are sometimes being played according to
Note that the support of a constant act strategy profile p equals the support of the lottery p in the usual sense of the word support.
Definition 8 Take an ambiguous game G = (I, Ω, S, A, ). We say that two strategy profiles f, g are observationally equivalent if they have the same support.
Observe that basic agreement holds in ambiguous games, this is important as the notion of "support" would not be well-defined without this assumption.
Preferences and Best replies 3.1 Transitivity, Monotonicity and Expected Utility Representation
Until now I have not specified the preferences of the players beyond requiring the properties of independent strategies and basic agreement. To get any results we will have to impose some further requirements. In this section I define a range of very basic properties of preferences for the context of ambiguous games.
(TR) Preferences are transitive.
(EU) Preferences over constant acts -that is preferences over lotteries -have an expected utility representation. 12 The assumption (EU) implies that there exists an affine function u : P(A) → R that represents the players preferences over constant acts (lotteries) P(A).
Finally I define two notions of monotonicity, both of which rely on eventwise comparisons of acts. These notions of monotonicity require that if an actor i prefers a strategy f J of a fixed subgroup of players J in every event to a strategy g J , holding the strategy of all other players fixed at f −J , then player i should prefer the strategy profile f := f J × f −J to the strategy profile g := g J × f −J . I will present a weaker (MON) and a stronger (SMON) version of this basic idea.
(MON) Take two acts f, g and a subset of players J ⊂ I, such that f −J = g −J . If for all non-
(SMON) Take two acts f, g and a subset of players J ⊂ I, such that f −J = g −J . If for all non-
and if there exists a non-null event E * ∈ f (standard MON) Take two acts f, g if for all non-null states s ∈ Ω we have f (s) i g(s) then
(MON) and (standard MON) differ with respect to the following three aspects. First of all, (MON) specifically relates to the context of game theory in the sense that (MON) does not only rank acts that can be compared for every event in f −1 , it also ranks acts that can be compared for every event in f −1 J , for every subset of strategiesJ. (MON) looks a lot more similar to (standard MON) for the case of a single agent decision problem (i.e. for J = I). In that case (MON) would only rank acts that can be compared on every state.
Secondly, (standard MON) amalgamates two very different assumptions. These assumptions are one of state independence that could be stated as p E h q E h implies p q and one of monotonicity which could be stated as if there exists a S-measurable act h for each non-null
The first assumption rules out state dependent preferences, whereas only the second assumption should be interpreted as a form of monotonicity. In fact Schmeidler [21] interprets (standard MON) as an assumption of state independent preferences.
Independence plays a big role in the present study, I not only assume that preferences are state independent, I assume that all players strategies are independent (which can in turn be interpreted as a form of state independence as argued above). Since independence plays such a central role in the present study I chose to disentangle it from the assumption of monotonicity.
However, as long as independence holds (which is, of course, the case for ambiguous games as defined here) (MON) and (SMON) can be rewritten as:
(MON') Take two acts f, g and a subset of players
(SMON') Take two acts f, g and a subset of players
Thirdly, (standard MON) and (MON) differ insofar as that (standard MON) is defined for the case of complete preferences whereas (MON) applies to preferences that are potentially incomplete. To fully appreciate the similarity between the two concepts let me restate (MON)
for the case of an ambiguous game with a single player with complete preferences (or in other words, for the case of the decision problem of an agent with state independent and complete preferences). In this case we have that f (s) i g(s) for all non-null states implies f i g and
for all non-null states implies f i g. Clearly this assumption is only marginally stronger than (standard MON).
Best Replies are Sometimes Optimal
In this subsection I provide a very first characterization of the acts that can be best replies if the player's preferences satisfy (MON) and (SMON) respectively. I show that under the second assumption players need to always play a best reply whereas it can suffice to sometimes play a best reply under the first assumption. To clearly state this I need to define the notions of "sometimes" and "always".
We say that f i is always a best reply to f −i if there is no
is never a best reply to f −i if for all
. Finally we say that f i is sometimes a best reply if it is not never a best reply.
Lemma 1 Take an ambiguous game G = (I, Ω, S, A, ) satisfying (EU) and (MON). If f is
an ambiguous act equilibrium in the game G then f i is sometimes a best reply to f −i .
Proof Suppose not, that is suppose for some player i f i was never a best reply to f −i . Fix an arbitrary non-null E ∈ f −1 i . By the definition of f i never being a best reply we can find a S i -measurable act h E i and a lottery p
is a best reply. 
Uncertainty Aversion
This is a study of games with uncertainty averse players. The power of the other more standard axiom ((TR),(E))(MON) and (SMON)) has been exhausted by Lemma 1. It is time to introduce a notion introduce a notion of uncertainty aversion to derive stronger results.
Schmeidler's [21] definition of ambiguity aversion is based on a preference for randomization:
if an agent is indifferent between two uncertain acts then he should like an objective randomization over these two acts at least as much as either one of them. For the context of incomplete preferences Schmeidler's axiom can formally be stated as.
(UA1) Let f, f , g be three S-measurable acts and let neither g i f nor g i f be true.
Then it cannot be true that g i αf + (1 − α)f .
The same axiom has been used in Gilboa and Schmeidler [10] and in Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini [15] to define ambiguity aversion. 13 I will not attempt to motivate Schmeidler's axiom here and refer the interested reader to extensive literature on uncertainty aversion for a discussion of Schmeidler's axiom. 14 The preferences described by Schmeidler [21] , Gilboa and Schmeidler [10] and in Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini [15] all satisfy a form of monotonicity that is stronger than (MON) but falls short of (SMON). This type of monotonicity could also be seen as a defining characteristic of uncertainty aversion. Remember that (MON) requires that an act f is (strictly) preferred to an act g if f is strictly preferred to g in every non-null state. (SMON) proposes a weaker criterion for the ranking of two acts f and g. The act f is preferred to the act g if f is in no event worse than g and is better in at least one non-null event. Intuitively we want to define uncertainty aversion such that an act f is better than an act g if f is in no event worse than g and if f is strictly better in the "worst case". So while under (SMON) an act that is never worse is considered better if it is better in at least one non-null event, uncertainty aversion considers the act better if it is better in a particular event, the "worst case". To define uncertainty aversion we first need to find a suitable notion of the "worst case". We do so by singling out an event E such that f yields a "worst payoff" on this event. Formally we define (UA2) in the spirit of 
. 13 As said above, (UA1) is an incomplete preferences version of Schmeidler's axiom, the statement of this axiom looks different in the studies mentioned above, as they are concerned with complete preferences.
14 The interested reader might consult Gilboa and Schmeidler [10] and Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini [15] as a start.
Two conditions need to be satisfied to establish a strict preference f i g following (UA2).
The first condition says that g cannot be ranked higher than f for any state (there exists no
The second says that f is ranked strictly better in the worst case, where a state s * is defined as a worst case if there exists no non-null
Examples of Preferences
To illustrate the notions defined above as well as all of the following results we will make use of a range of different examples of preference structures which we define in examples 3 -8. For the sake of clarity I drop the index i in this subsection. such that preferences over acts a represented by the following function:
where the events E k are defined such that {E 1 , ...,
Example 6 The preferences of a player can be represented by an uncertainty loving utility function using multiple priors if there exists an affine function u : P(A) → R and convex and compact set Q ⊂ ∆ such that such that for all f, g f g if and only if max
Example 7 The preferences exhibit Knightian uncertainty following Bewley [5] if there exists an affine function u : P(A) → R and convex and compact set Q ⊂ ∆ such that such that for all
In all other cases the player cannot rank the acts f and g and we write f g. 
Best Replies of Uncertainty Averse Players are Always Optimal
Lemma 2 Take an ambiguous game G = (I, Ω, S, A, ) satisfying (EU) and (UA2). Let f be an ambiguous act equilibrium in the game G. This implies that f i is always a best reply to f −i .
15 Klibanoff [11] proves this for the case of example 4, his proof can easily be amended to the other two examples. 16 We can define two conditions (UL1) and (UL2) that replace (UA1+2) for example 6 replacing i by ≺i wherever it appears in the definition of (UA1+2).
Proof Suppose not, suppose that g i is a best reply to f −i but is not always a best reply to f −i . The proof proceeds with the construction of an act f i that is a strictly better response.
Since g i is not always a best reply to f −i we can find an event E * ∈ g
and an act h i and a
By independence we have that (p
. So we know that f i and g i differ on a non-null event. Next observe that by the construction of f i there does not exist any s such
) and g i cannot have been a best reply in the first place.
Lemma 2 implies that the set of AAE of a game G = {I, A, } is a subset of all rationalizable profiles of that game. I state this without a formal proof since such a proof would require the definition of too many additional concepts. Once these concepts are defined, the proof is a straightforward application of existing results on the strategy profiles that survive the iterated elimination of dominated strategies. 17 Corollary 1 Take a a game G = (I, A, ) and consider all ambiguous act extensions of G satisfying (EU) and (UA2). The set of actions that are sometimes being played in an ambiguous act equilibrium survive iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. 18 I next give an example of an ambiguous game G and a strategy profile f such that f is an ambiguous act equilibrium in G, but f is not always a best reply. Following Lemma 2 the preferences in that game G cannot satisfy (TR), (EU) and (UA2); Example 9 is consistent with (TR) and (EU) but violates (UA2).
Example 9
Take the following ambiguous game between Ann and Bob with G = ({a, b}, Ω, S, A, ) S a = {∅, Ω}, S b = {∅, {s 1 }, {s 2 }, {s 1 , s 2 }}. Let the following matrix represent the action spaces of Ann and Bob, and the payoffs of all pure strategy profiles. 17 For a definition of the procedure of iterated elimination of dominated strategies see Bernheim [4] and Pearce [20] , who introduced this notion. 18 Other notions of equilibrium for games with ambiguity averse players permit the use of strategies that are not rationalizable. Dow and Werlang [8] provide an example to illustrate that their equilibrium notion does not necessarily describe a subset of all rationalizable profiles. Klibanoff [11] refines his notion of equilibrium using the iterated deletion of dominated strategies as a criterion. 
Mixed Strategy Equilibria

Lemma 3 Take a game G = (A, I, ) assume (EU). Let G = (Ω, S, A, I, ) be an ambiguous act extension of G satisfying (MON). We have that p is an AAE of G if and only if p is a NE of G .
Proof Let p be an AAE of the ambiguous act extension G = (Ω, S, A, I, ) of G. Then we have that there exists no deviation f i for any player i such that (f i , p −i ) i p, in particular there exists no p i such that (p i , p −i ) i p, so p is a NE of G . Next assume that p is a NE of G . Suppose p was no AAE, that is suppose that there exists a deviation f i for player i such that (f i , p −i ) i p.
By (MON) there exists an E ∈ f −1 and an act
independence we conclude that (f i (s), p −i ) i p for s ∈ E, a contradiction to the assumption that p is a NE of G .
Lemma 3 should not come as a big surprise, as it should be intuitive that no uncertainty averse player has an incentive to deviate from a mixed strategy equilibrium p. A deviation to a different mixed strategy cannot improve the player's payoff as p is an NE. A deviation to an ambiguous act cannot improve the player's payoff as the player is uncertainty averse.
Corollary 2 Take an ambiguous game G = (I, Ω, S, A, ) assume (EU) and (MON). An AAE exists.
Proof Direct consequence of Lemma 3 and the fact that a finite game always has an NE.
Observational Equivalence
Matrices and Vectors
Fix B i × B −i ∈ A i × A −i , assume w.l.o.g. that B i consists of the first L elements of A i
and
The k'th column of the matrix U is denoted by U k , so we have that U = (U k ) k=1,...,K .
A generic vector p is assumed to be a column vector, row vectors are obtained by taking the transpose p . With this notation we can simply calculate player i's expected utility of a mixed strategy profile p with supp(
For any two vectors x, y of the same length we define the relations " > ", " ≥ ", " "
and " = " by x ≥ y if and only if x t ≥ y t for all components t, x y if and only if x t > y t for all components t, x = y if and only if x t = y t for all components t and finally x > y if and only if x ≥ y but not x = y. Using this notation we can express the following relation between two lotteries p i , q i :
.., K} simply as p i U > q i U . We denote the vector (x, x, ..., x) by x we let r := {x : x ∈ R}.
Ambiguous Act Equilibria and "Dominance"
The next Lemma describes a condition on all actions that might sometimes be played in a best reply. It is shown that there exists no "dominated" mixture over the set of actions played in a best reply in the sense that there does not exist any such mixture such that there exists another mixture that is a strictly better response in all non-null states.
Lemma 4 Take an ambiguous game G = (I, Ω, S, A, ) assume (TR), (EU), and (UA1+2).
Let f be an ambiguous act equilibrium in G. Define an n i × |supp(f −i )|-matrix U as above with B := supp(f ). There do not exist any p i , q i such that supp(q i ) ⊂ supp(f i ) and p i U q i U .
Proof Since f i is a best reply to f −i we know by Lemma 2, that f i has to always be a best reply.
There is no pair
for any non-null s. An application of (UA1) yields that there does not exist an r i such that (p i , f −i ) i (r i , f −i ) where r i is a mix over the constant act strategies f i (s) with supp(r i ) = supp(f i ).
Suppose there existed lotteries p i , q i such that supp(q i ) ⊂ supp(f i ) and p i U q i U . Since supp(r i ) = supp(f i ) we can represent the lottery r i as a sumr i + λq i for some λ ∈ (0, 1] and some lotteryr i . Now let us compare the lotteries r * i :=r i + λp i and r i . Observe that (TR) and (UA1+2) be satisfied.
Solid Ambiguous Act Equilibria
This game does not have an equilibrium with full support (no matter which values we assign to u b (a i , b j )). This follows from Lemma 4 and the observation that pU qU for p = (0, 0, 1) and q = ( The equilibrium constructed in the prior example strikes me as particulary unappealing.
Why would Ann play a 1 when playing a 2 is never worse for Ann and strictly better in some non-null event? The preceding example proves that a theory of games with ambiguity averse players can yield different predictions than standard game theory: the game defined above does not have a mixed strategy equilibrium with full support. It has to be said however, that the differences between these two theories should not depend on such shaky examples in which some player uses a strategy that is "dominated" in the sense that this player has another strategy available that is never worse and strictly better in some non-null event. Let me therefore define a refinement of AAE that rules out such peculiar behavior. 20 Definition 10 Take an ambiguous game G = {I, Ω, S, A, }. We say that an AAE f is a solid ambiguous act equilibrium (SAAE) if there does not exist any
for all non-null states s and (f i , f −i )(s * ) f (s * ) for some non-null state s * .
Remark 2 For all preferences that satisfy (SMON) the set of AAE coincides with the set of all SAAE. This is important insofar as that the refinement proposed here does not have any bite for games with expected utility maximizing agents as their preferences always satisfy (SMON).
Consequently the present refinement is not equivalent to any other refinement proposed for the context of mixed strategy equilibria.
The results on the relation between NE's and AAE's of section 4 transfer to the case of SAAE's. To see this I state and prove the folllowing variants of Lemma 3 and Corollary 2 next.
Lemma 5 Take a game G = (I, A, ) assume (EU). Let G = (I, Ω, S, A, ) be an ambiguous act extension of G satisfying (MON). We have that p is an SAAE of G if and only if it is a NE of G .
Proof We know from Lemma 3 that any p is an AAE of G if and only if it is an NE of G . So we only need to show that any NE of G is a SAAE in G. So suppose that the AAE p is not solid.
That is suppose there exists a player i and a strategy f i such that (f i , p −i )(s) i p(s) for all nonnull states and (
and p(s) = p as p −i , p are constant acts. So we conclude that (f i (s * ), p −i ) i p which stands in contradiction that p being an NE of G .
Corollary 3 Take an ambiguous game G = (Ω, S, A, I, ) assume (EU) and (MON). A SAAE exists.
Proof The proof follows as a direct consequence of Lemma 5 and the fact that any finite game has an NE. 20 Klibanoff [11] already discussed this unappealing feature of the theory of uncertainty aversion at the hand of preferences that can be represented following Gilboa and Schmeidler (example 4). His way to remedy the problem is to derive a representation of preferences that does not have this feature, these preferences violate the continuity axiom. My approach can be seen as complementary to Klibanoff's: I do keep Gilboa and Schmeidler's preferences in the set of preferences to be considered, however I do strengthen the equilibrium concept.)
In the sequel I will only be concerned with SAAE. Example 10 shows that the set of SAAE is a strict subset of the set of AAE. The main goal of this study is to show that the set of SAAE is observationally equivalent to the set of NE in two player games with uncertainty averse players.
This also implies that any difference between the set of AAE and the set of NE arises from the fact that AAE need not be SAAE. Said differently, a player might use a strategy f i in an AAE even though he has an alternative strategy g i that is never worse and sometimes strictly better, this could never happen in an NE.
Finally, let me amend Lemma 4 to the case of SAAE.
Lemma 6 Take an ambiguous game G = (I, Ω, S, A, ) assume (TR), (EU) and (UA1+2). Let
Proof The proof follows mutatis mutandis, strengthening (MON) in the last conclusion by the requirement that the equilibrium hast to be solid.
"Dominance" and Mixed Strategy Equilibria
The next Lemma describes a condition under which we can find a probability p −i on all the actions of all other players such that the actions in B i ⊂ A i yield a constant maximal utility given p −i . This condition can again be described as a "dominance" condition for mixtures over the actions that are played in the best reply and mixtures among all other actions.
Lemma 7 Take a game G = (I, A, ). Define B ⊂ A and the matrices U, V, W as above.
Suppose there do not exist any p i , q i such that p i U > q i V . Then there exists a probability
(⇐) Suppose there exists no p −i ∈ ∆ + , x ∈ R such that V p −i = x and W p −i ≤ x. This is equivalent to: S ∩ r = ∅ for S := {s|s V = V p −i and s W ≥ W p −i for some p −i ∈ ∆ + } and r = {x|x ∈ R}. Since S is a convex set there exists a separating hyperplane H such that r ⊂ H and H ∩ S = ∅. Let this plane H be described by a vector λ such that λ x = 0 implies x ∈ H and λ x > 0 for all x ∈ S. Since r ⊂ H we have that λ i = 0.
Next define two vectors κ and ρ by κ l = λ l if λ l > 0 and κ l = 0 otherwise. Also let ρ l = −λ l if λ l < 0 and ρ l = 0 otherwise. Observe that κ l = ρ l > 0 21 . Define λ, κ and ρ by
Observe that λ and λ as normal vectors describe the same plane. Consequently we have that λ x > 0 for all x ∈ S. As λ = κ − ρ we have that κ x > ρ x for all x ∈ S.
We show next that ρ l = 0 for all l > L. Suppose we had ρ l > 0 for some l > L. Fix an x > S, observe that κ x > ρ x has to hold for this x as this has to hold for all x ∈ S. Next
. By our construction of S we can find such anx that is also an element of S. Observe that
Where the very last observation follows from the fact thatρ l ×κ l = 0 and x −l =x −l . But ρ x >κ x stands in contradiction withκ x >ρ x holding for all x ∈ S. We conclude thatρ l = 0 for all l > L.
Observe that the ρ, κ are by construction elements of ∆ n i . As
To conclude this proof observe that κU k ≥ ρU k = ρV k for all k = 1, ..., K as any U k can be approached by a sequence x n ∈ S. Finally it cannot be true that κU k = ρU k for all k ∈ {1, ..., K} as we could then find x ∈ S with κx = ρx. So it must be true that κU k > ρU k = ρU k for some k ∈ {1, ..., K}. So we found two probabilities κ and ρ such thatκ U >ρ V .
Observational Equivalence: The Main Result
Theorem 1 Let G = ({a, b}, A, ) assume (TR), (EU) and (UA1+2). The set of SAAE of G is observationally equivalent to the set of NE of G.
Proof
(⇐) Let p be an NE of G, then by Lemma 5 p itself is an SAAE of G, so G has an SAAE with the same support.
(⇒) Let f be an SAAE of G. Define an L×|supp(f 2 )|-matrix U as above with B := supp(f ).
Following Lemma 6 there do not exist any p 1 , q 1 such that supp(q 1 ) ⊂ supp(f 1 ) and p 1 U > q 1 U .
Applying Lemma 7 we conclude that there exists a probability p 2 on A 2 with supp(p 2 ) = supp(f 2 ) 21 The vectors κ and ρ are defined such that 
• a Dow-Werlang equilibrium (DWE) if p * i ∈ Q i and there does not exist a q i ∈ Q i such that
• a Marinacci equilibrium (ME) if p * i ∈ Q i and supp(p * i ) ⊂ supp(q i ) for all q i ∈ Q i for i = a, b 22 The equilibrium notions do not only differ with respect to their different requirements for consistency between a players strategy and all other player's beliefs about this strategy. I chose to abstract from all other differences to make the comparison as easy as possible. Consequently the following definition would appear as an oversimplification for any other purpose 23 Here the affine utility u i : P(A) → R represents the preferences i of player i.
• a Lo equilibrium (LE) if p * i ∈ Q i and a i ∈ supp(q i ) for any q i ∈ Q i implies that a i maximizes EU i (p i , q −i ) for i = a, b
Let me state without proof that the following subset relation between the different concepts holds: (NE)⊂(LE)⊂(ME)⊂(DWE)⊂(KE), where the difference between the first and the second set of equilibria in this chain arises since players might use strategies that are never better and sometimes worse in (LE). If one where to apply a refinement similar to solidity of section 5.3 the difference would disappear. Let me use the following example of Klibanoff [11] to show that the difference between NE and the three other concepts is more substantial. This example raises an important question: The preferences used to define the KE, DWE and ME satisfy (TR), (MON) and (UA1+2), so how can there be any equilibria following these concepts that differ so starkly from the NE of a game? Do these games violate independence and/or basic agreement? I will argue in the sequel that the difference between these equilibrium notions and NE lies not so much in their allowance for ambiguity averse players but rather in a violation of "basic agreement". To do so I need some more definitions. Since the agents in a standard game without agreement are expected utility maximizers there exists a probability q i on Ω and an affine function u i : P(A) → R for every player i such that the utility of the player can be represented by u i (f )dq i for all S-measurable acts f . We call a mixed strategy p i equivalent to a strategy f i for player i if p i (a i ) = f i (s)dq i for all a i .
Standard Games without Agreement
Definition 14 Take a standard game without agreement G = (I, Ω, S, A, ). A strategy profile
f is called an equilibrium without agreement Ew/oA if there exists no S i -measurable act f i :
We call a mixed strategy profile p an equilibrium without agreement of a game G = (I, A, ) if there exists a standard extension without agreement G of G such that f is an equilibrium without agreement in G and f i is equivalent to p i for every player i.
In short these notions parallel the notions for ambiguous games, relaxing the assumption of basic agreement. Next I'll relate the equilibrium constructed in example 13 to an Ew/oA in the same game. is an Ew/oA of the game G = (I, A, ) as described in example 13.
Ambiguity Neutrality versus Basic Agreement
In the next theorem I show that the relationship between the equilibrium constructed in example 13 and the Ew/oA in example 14 is not accidental.
Theorem 2 Take a game G = ({a, b}, A, ) with two players. Let p be a KE of G . Then p is an Ew/oA of G .
Proof Let p * be a KE. Then we have that p * a maximizes min q b ∈Q b p a U q b . Fan's theorem implies that the order of minimization and maximization can be exchanged. So p * a is a solution to min 
Observe that in f Ann believes she always plays p * a and Bob believes that he always plays p * b , so f is equivalent to p * . Next observe that both players are best replying: Ann believes that Bob always plays q * b which was picked such that p * a is a best reply to q * b and conversely for Bob. So f is an Ew/oA in G and is equivalent to p. The strategy profile (a 1 , b 1 ) is not a KE. To see this suppose to the contrary that it would be a KE. This implies that there exists a set Q a with 1 ∈ Q a such that playing b 1 is a best reply for Bob. Since 1 ∈ Q a we have that Bob's utility of playing b 1 is 0. On the other hand Bob's utility of playing b 2 is not smaller than 1 since Bob receives a utility of at least one whether Ann plays a 1 or a 2 .
However, it is easy to find a standard extension without agreement such that (a 1 , b 1 ) is an equilibrium in that standard extension: To see this take the standard extension constructed above and observe that the strategy profile constructed above is also an Ew/oA in this game.
Corollary 4 Take a game G = ({a, b}, A, ) with two players. Let p be a ME or a DWE of G . Then p is an Ew/oA of G . The converse does not hold true.
Proof The proof follows from the observation that the set of all ME is a subset of the set of all DWE which in turn is a subset of the set of all KE.
Theorems 1 and 2 imply that the difference between mixed strategy equilibria and the existing equilibrium concepts for games with ambiguity averse players is not so much the relaxation of the assumption of ambiguity neutrality but rather a relaxation of "basic agreement"
(or common knowledge of rationality). However such disagreement on the events which might possibly happen is not sufficient to describe the set of all KE, DWE or ME. These equilibria are strict subsets of the equilibria of Ew/oA. Ambiguity aversion enters only insofar as that a player i would only take deviations from the opponent's actual strategy p * −i into account if this deviation lowers the payoff of i. Optimistic deviations are not considered.
I do find it problematic that the KE and DWE concepts do not restrict the weight that an ambiguity averse player assigns to these actions which are "never" chosen by the opponent. In these concepts beliefs freely equilibrate. If a belief that has Ann think that s 1 happens with probability 1 while Bob thinks that s 1 happens with probability 0 is needed to sustain a strategy profile p as an equilibrium, this is fine following these two concepts. In my definition of ME I suppressed one major aspect to make ME more comparable to the other notions of equilibrium.
To be fair this aspect needs to be discussed here: Marinacci's definition of ME contains a parameter that describes the ambiguity level in a game. Beliefs are not freely equilibrating, to the contrary the gap between Ann's belief and Bob's actual strategy is determined by the parameter that describes the ambiguity level of the game. This parametrization imposes the necessary discipline to structure a limited deviation from "basic agreement".
Finally let me say that Theorem 1 can be used to justify Lo's concept -for the two player case. Lo eliminates disagreement by requiring that a i ∈ supp(q i ) for any q i ∈ Q i implies that a i maximizes EU i (p i , q −i ) for i = a, b. This requirement could be restated as: any action that Bob plays in a state that is considered non-null by Ann has to be an optimal action for Bob.
So Ann and Bob might as well agree on the set of null states. The advantage of the present study is that the equilibrium concept does not use and ad hoc assumptions that relate to a particular representation of preferences. The observational equivalence is derived from a small and straightforward set of axiom that encompasses a wide set of preferences.
Games with More than Two Players
The definitions in this paper all apply to n-player games. The main result of this paper, Theorem 1, only pertains to 2 player games. Does this result extend to n-player games? In this section I will first provide an example that the answer is negative. A theory of games with more than two ambiguity averse players carries the potential to yield substantially different predictions from standard theory of mixed strategy equilibrium. I will then provide some reasons why a detailed study of this question lies beyond the scope of this paper. I will claim that the basic understanding of "common priors" and "independent strategies" in an environment without priors developed here does not suffice to tackle the case of n-players. A better grasp of these concepts is needed to fully understand the case of games with more than two players. The following example builds on Example 2.3 in Aumann [2] .
Example 16 Take the following ambiguous game G = ({1, 2, 3}, Ω, S, A, ). Let Ω = {s, r}, S 1 = S 2 = {∅, Ω} and S 3 the set of all subsets of Ω. Player 3 is an expected utility maximizer that assigns probability Aumann [2] shows that the the game in example 16 has no NE with (T Lr) or (T Lr) in its support. At the same time he shows that the game has a "correlated equilibrium" 24 in which the first two players play T, L. A necessary condition for the existence of such a "correlated equilibrium" is that player 1 assigns a higher probability to player 3 picking l than player r does.
Aumann shows in particular that there is such an equilibrium if player 1 believes that player 3
chooses the left matrix with a probability of 3 4 whereas player 2 believes that this probability is So is a game theory with ambiguity averse players going to herald a revival of game theory without common priors? Is any NE without common priors observationally equivalent to an SAAE with ambiguity averse players? My intuition is that the answer to this question is a yes -a very unsatisfying yes. To see this observe that the assumption of "basic agreement" only imposes that players agree on the set of nun-null states. This assumption does not preclude a scenario in which all players are expected utility maximizers but do not have common priors on the relevant events. This result would not be driven by the players ambiguity aversion (in fact player would be assumed to be expected utility maximizers) but would instead be driven by the fact that the assumption of "basic agreement" is a very weak one. This assumption was strong enough for the purpose of the present paper: the observational equivalence result could be derived using only this weak assumption on the players agreement of beliefs. The condition of "basic agreement" would have to be strengthened considerably for a study of games with more than 2 players.
In a similar vein the a deeper understanding of the independence assumption is needed to understand n-player games. The above example assumes that no players are uncertain about the strategies of players 1 and 2. Consequently the question whether S J is independent of S −J for all J ∈ {1, 2, 3} can easily be answered by a clear yes. Matters look a little differently when players are uncertain about the strategies of multiple other players. The question if one player can be uncertain about the strategies of two different players and view there actions as independent remains open. These questions on "common priors" and "independent strategies" merit careful attention, they have to be solved before the study of games with more than two players can be 24 Aumann [2] uses the term "correltated equilibrium" to designate two different deviations from standard theory: 1. players can use correlation devices, 2. Players do not need to have common priors. The present correlated equilibrium only deviates with respect to the second criterion from standard theory.
continued. 25 
Conclusion
The two main results of this paper are negative: I first show that an outside observer cannot distinguish whether a game is played by two uncertainty averse players or two uncertainty neutral ones. I go on to show that the different predictions of alternative equilibrium concepts for uncertainty averse players are not so much a result of the assumption of uncertainty aversion but rather a result on the players disagreements on the possible occurrence of all events in the state-space. Is there any hope for a manageable theory of games with uncertainty averse players that yields predictions that differ from standard theory?
For me, the answer is a clear yes. I see the following three avenues for future research. I already discussed the benefits of Marinacci's [16] equilibrium concept in section 6. The advantage of his concept is that he parameterizes the uncertainty of players in a game. In the light of the present study such a parametrization seems very important as we need to give up on "basic agreement" in a controlled fashion. Marinacci's approach allows us to find equilibrium predictions for ambiguity averse players that differ from the equilibrium predictions of mixed strategy equilibrium while retaining control over the gap between the player's actual strategies and other players beliefs on these strategies. 26 Marinacci's main contribution is a proof of existence of ME for any level of uncertainty. The concept has yet to prove its merits in applied studies.
Even if we insist on basic agreement a game theory with uncertainty averse players might yield observationally different results.
Theorem /Main Theorem crucially depends on the assumption of Schmeidler's [21] axiom on uncertainty aversion (UA1). I showed in example ?? that a game theory with ambiguity averse players who are modelled following Bewley [5] (example 7) can yield observationally different predictions from the standard theory of mixed strategy equilibrium.
Finally, I showed with example 16 that a game theory with more than 3 ambiguity averse players carries the potential to yield observationally different results from the theory of mixed 25 Lo [14] covers games with more than 2 players. He assumes that preferences can be represented following Gilboa and Schmeider [10] (example 4). He solves the two questions by assuming Gilboa and Schmeidler's representation of independent strategies and replacing the common priors assumption by the assumption that the belief sets of all players have to be equal. This is unsatisfactory as neither of these answers is axiomatically founded. Eichberger and Kelsey [9] acknowledge that independence and common priors matter for the context of games with more than 2 players. They do not attempt to tackle these questions in their article. 26 Eichberger and Kelsey [9] provide an alternative parametrization of the degree of uncertainty in a game.
strategy equilibrium. The development of such a theory has to be preceded by a deeper investigation of "independent strategies" and "common priors" in a context where there are no priors.
